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For the first 10 years after independence in 1966,
Botswana remained a member of the Rand Monetary
Area (RMA), using the Rand as its currency and
having no central bank of its own.
There were advantages:
Investment from the RMA was encouraged.
Tourism from the RMA was also encouraged,
especially by the absence of exchange controls
between the two countries.
(e) Individuals and institutions in Botswana,
including the commercial banks, were able to invest
liquid funds in the Johannesburg money market.
In addition, the Botswana Government could have
had a significant and increasing income by staying in
the RMA. New arrangements for the RMA were being
negotiated in 1975, under which the three smaller
states were offered interest on a quite generous
estimate of the Rand currently circulating in each
country, plus a formula for later growth in currency
circulation. Botswana withdrew from the negotiations
in order to create an independent monetary system;
Lesotho and Swaziland signed the agreement, which
applies to the Rand circulating in each country
(etimated total circulation, less the amount of local
flotes and coins issued).
It is possible that the slowdown in economic growth
after 1976 was partly caused by reduced foreign
investment from the RMA, in turn caused by fears of
the effects of the new monetary system. But the main
reason for the slowdown was that the economy was
between mining construction booms. With stagnant
demand there was little incentive to invest.
It is also possible that the growth of tourism was
adversely affected, although the number of arrivals
from the RMA doubled from 1976 to 1980. Whatever
adverse effects did exist on tourism and investment,
they were almost certainly small; and it is unlikely that
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they diminished over time, as it became clear that the
new regime was liberal and likely to remain so.
Depositors did lose the right to use the Johannesburg
money market, being obliged to hold domestic
deposits instead, at generally lower rates of interest.
The new central bank held the matching foreign
deposits, so that the public sector gained at the
expense of the private sector.
The main disadvantage of being in the RMA was the
very limited scope for independent macroeconomic
policy available to the Botswana Government.
Exchange controls, interest rates, the foreign exchange
rate, investment of the bulk of foreign exchange
reserves were entirely controlled by the South African
Government. There was little or no consultation on
these issues with the Botswana Government, which
also had only minimal control over domestic
commercial banks.
The Bank of Botswana was created in 1976. Costs
included annual expenses for running the Bank of
about one million Pula a year (including depreciation
of fixed assets and the cost of the new notes and coins),
an addition to the strain on skilled manpower (nearly
all the senior management was foreign), and the
increased risk of financial mismanagement. The
benefits included the availability of new policy
instruments, the building-up of financial expertise
(although this benefit was reduced by having to rely on
expatriates), increased opportunities for innovation in
financial institutions, and the transfer to the Bank of
Botswana of foreign funds previously held by the
private sector. Easily the most important of these
advantages was the availability of new policy
instruments, although success in using them was
dependent in turn on success in building up expertise.
1976-1981: The Good Times
From 1976 to 1981 the Bank of Botswana had a
relatively easy time. The balance of payments was
mainly in surplus, the reserves rose steadily to more
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than five months c.i.f. imports, the government had on
deposit at the Bank of Botswana between 30 and 50
per cent of a year's current revenue, and the
commercial banks did not show any signs of
expanding their lending too fast. The new exchange
control rules were extremely liberal (for a developing
country) and most of their administration could safely
be left to the commercial banks without fear of dire
consequences. The main use of the exchange control
rules was to transfer the liquid balances previously
held abroad (principally by the commercial banks and
the diamond mining company) from private holders to
the Bank of Botswana. The exchange control rules
also gave the Bank of Botswana some powers of
supervision over large loans by the commercial banks,
as foreign controlled companies had to get permission
to borrow locally more than the money they had
brought into Botswana and there were some limits to
the expatriation of capital.
The main efforts of the Bank of Botswana during this
period were devoted to trying various ways of getting
the commercial banks to lend more money and to lend
more of it long term. Botswana interest rates were
lowered to keep them below rates in South Africa.
Most imports (more than 85 per cent) came from
South Africa and therefore a large part of lending was
to finance South African imports. It was hoped that
more of this business could be done in Botswana if
there was a rate differential.
In order to enable or encourage the commercial banks
to make more (or even some) longer term loans, the
government deposited with them some of its surplus
balances at long term, since the banks claimed
(irrationally) that they could not lend long out of short
term deposits. In addition the government passed a
law enabling the commercial banks to take improved
security on cattle, the main locally owned asset. And
the Bank of Botswana issued only a small number of
Treasury Bills, and offered a very low rate of interest
to the commercial banks on the remainder of their
surplus liquidity. As a result the gap, between what the
commercial banks could get on a marginal loan and
the return on unlent money rose from about three to
about six percentage points.
On the whole, none of these measures worked, or at
least there was no evidence that they did. The lending
of the commercial banks barely rose for two years, and
rose only slowly for the next two - yet it had risen
from Pl4mn to P7lmn in the three years before the
Bank of Botswana started in 1976. As already noted,
the economy was between mining construction booms
during the period 1976to 1979: Selebi Phikwe (copper-
nickel) was complete, and Jwaneng (diamonds) had
not been started. The leading sector was the
government itself, and its efforts, held mostly within
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its capacity to implement projects efficienfly, barely
maintained the economy on the plateau reached in
1976.
Other monetary policy implemented during this
period included diversifying the investment of the
rapidly growing foreign exchange reserves, which rose
from P65mn in 1976 to P21 lmn in 1979 (and P261mn
in mid-1981). Before 1976, the country's de facto
foreign exchange reserves were held by the private
sector, nearly all in Rand (plus a small amount of
sterling held by the government). The reserves lost
value, therefore, whenever the Rand was devalued.
Monetary independence gave the Bank of Botswana a
chance to diversify the risk by investing in a portfolio
of currencies. The Bank also estimated how much of
the foreign exchange reserves really needed to be held
in short term and therefore lower yielding assets
(surprisingly little, since all the possible disaster
scenarios were found to take a long time to affect the
foreign exchange reserves). Investment policy was
fairly successful, no doubt partly from luck and partly
from the lack of financial crises to divert management
attention.
Exchange rate policy was used to moderate inflation.
The Pula was revalued upwards three times, to reduce
the impact of South African inflation on domestic
prices, especially as they affected lower income
groups. Revaluation was estimated to have a benign
effect on income distribution in Botswana, since the
poor spent more oftheir cash income on imports than
the rich (70 per cent against 40 per cent). The poor
spent largely on imported basic necessities, while the
rich spent significant amounts on locally produced
services. Research showed that the benefits of
revaluation, at least in times of relatively slack
demand, were indeed passed on to the consumer and
not retained by traders.
The Bank of Botswana also had the unusual task of
preventing the commercial banks from turning away
deposits. Because of the perceived lack of investment
opportunities, and a requirement concerning the
retention of profits to maintain certain capital ratios,
the commercial banks began to refuse large additional
deposits. 1f allowed to continue, this would have been
bad for the country's reputation as a place to do
business, and would have encouraged depositors to
seek ways of avoiding the exchange control rules on
keeping deposits in Botswana. So the Bank of
Botswana opened an account for one large mining
company, and for a number of parastatals. which
enabled the commercial banks to continue accepting
deposits from their other customers.
Knowledge offoreign currency markets also helped to
improve the quality of advice available to the
government on foreign borrowing and debt manage-
ment. Advice on domestic borrowing by the public
sector improved with experience. As with some of the
other Bank of Botswana activities, advice on
borrowing could in principle have been developed
without an independent monetary system and an
institution to run it, but in practice had not been and
probably would not have been.
1981-1982 Diamond Crisis: The Bad Times
In the middle of 1981 the diamond boom finally
reversed itself. For the first time in many years De
Beers (which sold 85 per cent of the world's gem
diamonds and had controlled the price of rough
stones) was not only forced to buy into the stockpile
(net) but also to impose quotas on producers,
including Botswana. Botswana chose to continue full
production, and stockpile the unsold stones. At one
stage, in late 1981 and early 1982, Botswana sold no
diamonds at all for three months. This was extremely
serious for the balance of payments, since before the
crisis diamonds had grown to represent more than 60
per cent of exports.
To make matters worse, lending by the commercial
banks had at last taken off. Stimulated by the
construction ofJwaneng: in 1981 bank lending rose by
more than 50 per cent, from P96mn to P148mn. The
foreign exchange reserves fell rapidly, from their peak
ofP26lmn in mid-1981 to P198mn in March 1982; and
it was estimated that without government action they
would virtually have disappeared by the end of that
year, even using quite optimistic guesses for diamond
sales. The only saving feature was that the new
diamond mine (Jwaneng) was due to start producing
in mid-year, which would increase Botswana's sales
quota with De Beers.
The most important single government decision was
not to wait to see whether (and when) the diamond
market would recover before taking action. It was
argued that adjustment might be very much more
difficult and costly ifthe foreign exchange reserves and
foreign credit had already been used, since the
required adjustment would then be larger and
therefore more disruptive, at a time when credit would
be harder and thus more expensive to get.
Actual measures taken included the following:
the biannual review of wages, due in early 1982,
recommended a zero increase at a time when price
rises since the last review suggested an increase of
about 27 per cent;
interest rates were increased, from 10.5 per cent
to 14.5 per cent, over 10 months;
(e) the commercial banks were asked to restrict
growth in their lending to a figure below the rate of
inflation, and the official liquid asset requirement was
increased in case they did not comply;
sales tax was introduced for the first time on a
number of non-essential goods;
the Pula was devalued by 10 per cent although
this only restored its rate against the Rand of a year
earlier (the Rand had been slipping down against other
currencies by more than the Pula);
the government announced its intention to cut
both capital and current expenditure;
the government drew down a previously
arranged but unused Eurodollar loan, because the
marginal cost of using it if the money were reinvested
in the same market (and not spent) was small; the cost
was thus very much less than negotiating a new loan at
a later date.
Just as significant as the measures taken was what the
government did not do: there was no general
tightening of exchange controls or import licensing,
and no additional foreign borrowing other than the
Eurodollar loan already mentioned.
The only changes in exchange controls were a minor
reinterpretation of the rules for local borrowing
allowed by foreign controlled companies, which had
been very generously interpreted during the previous
period. Other changes in the exchange control rules
were ruled out: it was thought that the business
community, which had plenty of experience of
draconian exchange controls in neighbouring
countries, both black and white ruled, would panic if
more drastic changes were made. It was not thought
that the Bank of Botswana would be able to control
the resulting flight of capital out of the country.
No additional foreign borrowing was undertaken to
sustain the foreign exchange reserves, in spite of the
lower cost of borrowing at once rather than later. The
government expected that it would be even more
difficult to hold the line on government spending and
lending if the foreign exchange reserves were to rise.
The possibility of arranging standby credits as an
alternative was discussed, but not pursued.
The government's strategy was to use as many of the
available policy instruments as possible, so as to avoid
putting too much strain on any one of them. There was
some concern that the degree ofwage restraint was too
severe, and that this would create unmanageable
problems later. But the next year's wage award was
only eight per cent, comfortably below the 1982
inflation rate of about 13 per cent, so that there was no
element of compensation for the fall in real wages in
1982.
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There was no way of knowing, in the case of several of
the adjustment measures, whether the main effect
would be on the demand for imports, or short term
capital movements. Both would have the same effect
on the foreign exchange reserves, but the government
was concerned that imports should actually be
reduced as well as expecting that the measures to make
credit scarce and more expensive would shift some
borrowing offshore.
Overall it was a very conventional package, so much
so that by the time the IMF arrived, in May 1982,
agreement was quickly and easily reached. Most of the
policy changes that would have been insisted on by the
IMF as conditions of a loan had already been
implemented. Indeed, the consequences of the
government's adjustment measures were already
taking effect. The foreign exchange reserves rose
rapidly, from a low of P198mn in March 1982, to
P3ølmn only two months later. As a result, the Letter
of Intent to the IMF, the essence of whose terms had
been agreed, was never sent.
The very rapid short term rise in the foreign exchange
reserves must have been caused by capital inflows; but
the maintenance of the reserves at that high level was
caused by the other measures, notably the wage freeze
which reduced real wages by about 20 per cent in 1982
and 25 per cent in 1983 compared to their 1981 base.
Known capital movements (the Eurodollar loan, a
switch offshore of some borrowing by the copper-
nickel mine and the paper gain in the reserves from
devaluation) amounted to P7lmn, with a further short
term capital inflow of about P3Omn in the two months
March to May 1982. Imports in 1982 were almost
exactly the same as in 1981, much lower than the rate
of inflation, and much lower than the 23 per cent rate
of increase in the previous year.
The attempt to reduce government spending played
only a small part in reducing imports: the rate of
growth of current spending fell from 18 and 13 per
cent, and the rate of growth of capital spending
actually increased. By the time that the expenditure
review was taking place the reserves were already
recovering, which no doubt reduced the incentive to
proceed with unpopular measures.
The main burden of the adjustment programme was
borne by the better off urban groups, who were
affected by the wage freeze and the cost and scarcity of
credit. Devaluation had a greater proportional impact
on the poor, as already explained; but the devaluation
was only a correction of the upward drift of the Pula
against the Rand, so that its effect was not as severe as
if it had taken place in different circumstances. In any
case, the government believed that the cost of failing to
adjust quickly and effectively could have been to
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create the sort of extreme scarcity of foreign exchange
and excessive foreign debt which had occurred in other
African countries. In those circumstances, the poor
suffer most: remote rural clinics run out of drugs, the
unskilled lose their jobs, goods are in short supply and
the better off tend to get access to the limited supply of
basic commodities. The best way of protecting the
welfare of the poor was thought to be by avoiding
severe macroeconomic imbalance.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from this
experience. First, as is well known, monetary policy is
like pulling and pushing on a piece of string. It works
when the objective is to slow down an expansion, but
not if the objective is to get the economy moving
during a period of slack aggregate demand. If
monetary policy is used to remove the brakes aftera
period of restraint, then it may be seen to be the cause
of expansion, provided of course that frustrated
demand survives the period of restraint; but it cannot
work on its own.
Second, the conventional package of measures to cut
demand was extremely successful in the particular
situation facing Botswana at the beginning of 1982.
The essential elements of that situation were that
Botswana had not introduced any significant controls
on foreign trade and payments, so that imports were
determined more or less entirely by income, capital
inflows and domestic credit creation. It was therefore
simple to reduce the demand for imports by reducing
the growth of income and credit - imports induced by
capital inflows would be self financing, and therefore
of little significance in the short run.
The apparent success of the measures in this case says
absolutely nothing about whether they would work in
countries which had strict controls on foreign
payments. The most that can be said is that
conventional adjustment measures would tend to
work in a very different way, evn if they were necessary
in different circumstances. It was also the case that
Botwana could afford not to worry unduly about the
mix between reduction in demand and short term
capital inflow because of the low external debt service
ratio at the time (less than two per cent).
Third, Botswana had enjoyed a period of remarkable
growth in real income and employment, as well as
exceptionally good prospects for promotion or
transfer to better jobs for a wide range of people. A
severe cut in real wages and salaries was much easier to
implement in such circumstances than if real income
had been static or falling for some years.
Fourth, the same argument applies to some extent to
bank lending. Local credit had been freely available,
from the National Development Bank and the
government as well as the commercial banks; so
borrowers had probably not used easily available
sources of foreign credit. They were also more willing
and able to finance themselves out of retained profits,
than if a tight credit situation had existed for some
time.
Fifth, Botswana was internationally creditworthy, so
that it was easy to shift borrowing to foreign sources
by making domestic credit scarce and expensive.
Many other African countries are not so fortunate,
even when agreement with the IMF has been reached.
Sixth, Botswana acted fast, not taking the apparently
easier option of using the reserves while waiting to see
if action could be avoided when and if a recovery
occurred in the diamond market. There were even
some accusations of overkill, understandable at a time
when the sort of commercial and industrial investment
that the government had been trying to get going for so
long was finally under way. Even in this, the aspect of
Botswana's case which owed most to good judgement
rather than good luck, the country was fortunate in
having to adjust later than most other countries and so
having their experiences as a guide.
Finally, the crisis was short lived. Diamond exports,
helped by production from Jwaneng, fell to P44mn in
the second half of 1981, from P123mn a year earlier;
but by the second half of 1982 they were at a new six
monthly high of Pl4lmn. The country's foreign trade
deficit fell from P239mn in 1981, to Pl3Omn in 1982;
and the overall balance improved from a deficit of
P6lmn to a surplus of P57mn. A major component in
this rapid turnaround was the recovery of exports to a
level slightly higher than before the fall in 1981. In this
Botswana was enormously lucky, compared with
countries that had to endure the (unexpectedly) severe
and prolonged consequences of the post-1979 world
recession.
It is unlikely, therefore, that the case ofBotswana is of
much direct relevance elsewhere in Africa. Nor should
it be assumed that external balance can be easily
restored by such conventional methods if controls on
foreign payments are removed. Evidence from
elsewhere in Africa suggests strongly that 'opening up'
an economy that has been closed for some time
releases an unmanageable demand for foreign
currency. There is not only a large accumulation of
pent up demand for foreign currency, previously
frustrated by controls; there is likely also to be large
additional demand, anticipating the return of controls
at any moment. In short, removal of controls
frequently lacks credibility, at least in developing
countries, and especially in Africa. So the status quo
ante cannot easily be restored in order to ensure that
conventional measures will work.
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